We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in the size of the rooms to be filled, the orderedness or completeness of the preferences, and the way of calculating the value of a coalition-based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of finding a Pareto optimal assignment, and the complexity of verifying Pareto optimality for a given assignment.
Introduction
The ubiquitous nature of coalition formation has been triggering researchers from various fields to study the behavior of individuals forming groups [10, 11, 13, 14, 19] . A large chunk of the gametheoretical studies focuses on the individuals having ordinal preferences over the possible outcomes [5] [6] [7] [8] 18] .
Our setting involves n players who need to be partitioned into coalitions. For convenience, we talk about assigning each player to a room. We assume the rooms to have no specific feature besides their capacity. To ensure a feasible partition in the outcome, we assume that the total capacity of rooms adds up to n, and a feasible assignment fills each room to its capacity. Each player submits her preference list over the other players. Four features of the problem define various settings, each of which is realistic and will be investigated by us. off, and no player is worse off than in the first assignment. The comparison here is defined based on point (iii) above. We shorten the term 'Pareto optimal assignment' to poa. Our goal is to study all 2 4 combinations of the above four features, and for each of them, determine the complexity of the following two problems:
(1) verifying whether a given feasible assignment is a poa;
(2) finding a poa.
Related literature
Pareto optimality in coalition formation has an extremely rich literature. We start with an overview on coalition formation viewed as a hedonic game. Then we review the settings in which the coalition size matters.
Hedonic games. Coalition formation under preferences can be seen as a hedonic game [3, 5, 6] . In such a game, players have preferences over the possible coalitions they can be part of, and coalitions can be of any size-notice that these two basic features strikingly differ from our setting. Pareto optimal coalition formation as a hedonic game is extensively studied by Aziz et al. [2] . They show that if the graph is incomplete, and preferences are determined based on the best roommate, then both verifying Pareto optimality for a given assignment, and deciding whether a poa exists are NP-complete. For complete lists and the same preferences, the grand coalition is a trivial optimal solution, since every player has their first-choice roommate in the sole room. Aziz et al. [2] also show that if preferences are determined based on the worst roommate, then both verifying Pareto optimality for a given assignment, and deciding whether a poa exists are solvable in polynomial time.
2-person rooms. Some of the literature concentrates on each coalition being of size 1 or 2. In this setting, a player can compare two coalitions simply based on the rank of the sole roommate (if any exists), so our point (iii) does not apply here. Using Morrill's algorithm [16] , Aziz et al. [2] show that even if preferences contain ties, both verifying Pareto optimality for a given matching, and calculating a poa are solvable in polynomial time. Their results are valid for complete and incomplete lists as well. Abraham and Manlove [1] consider Pareto optimal matchings as a means of coping with instances of the stable roommates problem with strict lists, which do not admit a stable matching. They show that while a maximum size poa is easy to find, finding a minimum size poa is NP-hard.
3-person rooms.
For the setting in which a room can accommodate up to 3 players, two versions of the problem have been studied. A three-cyclic game is a hedonic game in which the set of players is divided into men, women, and dogs and only kind of acceptable coalitions are manwoman-dog triplets [15, 17] . Furthermore, men only care about women, women only care about dogs and dogs only care about men. Computing a poa is known to be NP-hard for these games, while the corresponding verification problem is coNP-complete, even for strict preferences [2] . In room-roommate games, a set of players act as rooms, and these have no preferences whatsoever. The ordinary players, on the other hand, have a preference list over all possible roommate-room pairs they find acceptable. A triplet is feasible if exactly one player in it plays a room. If preferences are strict, then a poa can be computed in polynomial time, but the problem becomes NP-hard as soon as ties are introduced, even if all lists are complete [2] . Just as in the previous problem, the verification version is coNP-complete, even for strict preferences [2] .
Preferences depending on the room size. Anonymous hedonic games [4] are a subclass of hedonic games in which the players' preferences over coalitions only depend on coalition sizes. Both verification and finding a poa are hard in such games [2] . Darmann [9] studies a group activity selection model in which players have preferences not only on the activity, but also on the number of participants in their coalition. He provides an efficient algorithm to find a poa, if each player wants to share an activity with as many, or as few players as possible.
As we have seen, a number of papers investigate the complexity of finding a poa under various settings, such as limited coalition size or preferences over players rather than over coalitions. However, there is no work on the combination of these two. In our setting, homogeneous players rank each other, and form coalitions of an arbitrary, but fixed size.
Our contribution
We tackle the problems of verifying Pareto optimality and finding a poa for a set of fixed coalition sizes. We distinguish 2 4 cases, based on the completeness and the orderedness of preferences, the way of comparing two coalitions by a player, and the room sizes. Our findings are summarized below and in Figure 1 .
• Verification is coNP-complete in all cases. We show this in Section 2 by two reductions from triangle cover problems. • If lists are incomplete, then deciding whether a feasible assignment exists is already NP-complete in all cases. On the other hand, if a feasible assignment does exist, then an optimal one exists as well. These are due to a simple NP-completeness reduction and a monotonicity argument, which can be found in Section 3. • For complete lists, a poa is bound to exist. In 3 out of the 16 cases, serial dictatorship delivers one. In all other cases, by computing any poa in polynomial time, one could answer an NPcomplete decision problem in polynomial time. In Section 4 we elaborate on these. For the positive results, we interpret serial dictatorship in the current problem settings. Then, we utilize a tool developed by Aziz et al. [2] in the hardness proofs.
Verification
In this section, we show the hardness of verification for all cases. We present two proofs: in Theorem 1, the worst roommate defines the base of comparison for two coalitions, while its is the best roommate who counts in Theorem 2. Other than this, we restrict our reduction to the least general case of the problem, having strict and complete lists, and 3-person rooms.
To show hardness, we reduce the following two hard problems to ours. The triangle cover problem asks for a set of vertex-disjoint 3-cliques (triangles) in the input graph G, so that these cover all vertices of G. This problem has been shown to be NP-complete by Garey and Johnson [12] . It is easy to see that the directed version of triangle cover is also hard. To reduce this version to the undirected triangle cover, one only needs to replace each edge of G by a pair of bidirected parallel edges to derive the directed graph D. A triangle cover exists in G if and only if a directed triangle cover exists in D. 
Theorem 1 (Verification, strict and complete lists, worst roommate counts, 3-person rooms).
Supposing that the preferences of a player depend on the worst roommate, verifying whether a given assignment is Pareto optimal is a coNP-complete task even if all preferences are strict and complete, and every room is of size 3.
Proof. To each instance G of triangle cover we will construct an instance of our verification problem, consisting of players with strict and complete preferences, and an assignment on which Pareto optimality is to be verified. We will show that a triangle cover exists in the first instance if and only if the assignment has a Pareto improvement.
First we draw graph G and also make two further copies of its vertex set V 1 . We denote these copies by V 2 and V 3 . To show hardness in the most general case, the constructed graph must be complete. The edges can be partitioned into four classes.
• The original edges of G are solid and black in Figure 2 . These edges are the best choices of both of their end vertices, and the order among them can be chosen arbitrarily. • The copied vertices V 2 and V 3 are connected by dotted blue triangles, as shown in Figure 2 .
Each such triangle connects three vertices that originate from three different vertices of G. The rank of these edges is the highest possible, and their order among themselves does not matter. • The three copies of the same vertex in G are connected by a dashed red triangle in Figure 2 .
These edges are ranked lower than the solid black and the dotted blue edges. The order among them does not matter. • All edges not visible in Figure 2 are ranked lower than the listed edges, in an arbitrary order.
The verification will happen with respect to the assignment built by all dashed red edges. If G has a triangle cover, then these solid black triangles cover the entire set V 1 . In our assignment problem, these triangles translate into coalitions of size 3. The dotted blue triangles on V 2 and V 3 complete the alternative assignment. It is easy to see that every agent is better off by switching to the solid black and the dotted blue edges, since they are always ranked higher than the dashed red edges. Now we show the opposite direction. If there is a Pareto improvement to the assignment marked by the dashed red edges, then it may use none of the invisible edges, since they are all worse than the dashed red ones, and no player is allowed to receive a worse partner in the improved assignment. So we need to find an alternative assignment using only the first 3 types of edges. It is clear that by breaking any dashed red coalition, at least one agent in each vertex group should be reassigned to a different coalition. Now, players in V 2 ∪ V 3 can only choose a dotted blue edge instead of a dashed red one. The sparsity of edges gives us that if there exists one dotted blue edge in a triangle, then not only the whole triangle is dotted blue, but we also must have all of the dotted blue triangles in the new assignment-otherwise players remain unassigned. Thus, in the new assignment, we must have all of the dotted blue triangles, and V 1 's vertices are free to be grouped up among themselves. This they can only do using the solid black edges, which correspond to the original edges in G. Thus if we have a Pareto improvement of the dashed red assignment, then we can cover V 1 with disjoint, solid black triangles. It means that G has a triangle cover.
Theorem 2 (Verification, strict and complete lists, best roommate counts, 3-person rooms).
Supposing that the preferences of a player depend on the best roommate, verifying whether a given assignment is Pareto optimal is a coNP-complete task even if all preferences are strict and complete, and every room is of size 3.
Proof. This proof follows the lines of the previous one, but it reduces our problem to directed triangle cover. To each instance D of directed triangle cover we will construct an instance of our verification problem, consisting of players with preferences, and an assignment on which Pareto optimality is to be verified. We will show that a directed triangle cover exists in the first instance if and only if the assignment has a Pareto improvement. First we draw the directed graph D and make two further copies of its vertex set V 1 . We denote these copies by V 2 and V 3 . Just as in our previous proof, the edges of this complete graph can be partitioned into four classes. Notice that the preferences are designed for this particular proof.
• The original directed edges of D are solid and black in Figure 3 . These edges are the best choices of their starting vertex and they are ranked below the dashed red edges at their end vertex.
The order among all outgoing and among all incoming directed edges of the same vertex can be chosen arbitrarily. • The copied vertices V 2 and V 3 are connected by dotted blue triangles, as shown in Figure 3 .
Each such triangle connects three vertices that originate from three different vertices of D. The rank of these edges is either 1 or 4, so that the triangle forms a preference cycle, i.e. each edge is ranked first by one end vertex and fourth by the other one. Edges in the middle, ranked second and third, will be the dashed red edges. • The three copies of the same vertex in G are connected by a dashed red triangle in Figure 3 .
These edges are ranked between outgoing and incoming edges in D at vertices in V 1 , and they are ranked second and third by vertices in V 2 ∪V 3 . The order among them matters: the triangles themselves must form a preference cycle. • All edges not visible in Figure 3 are ranked lower than the listed edges, in an arbitrary order.
Again, the verification will happen with respect to the assignment built by all dashed red edges.
Suppose that there exists a directed triangle cover in D. This means that each vertex in V 1 has an outgoing edge in the triangle cover, which is a first-choice roommate in the assignment problem. So switching to the coalitions marked by the triangle partition would be a Pareto improvement for the vertices in V 1 . We need to take care of the vertices in V 2 ∪ V 3 too. The dotted blue triangles complete the alternative assignment, and due to the cyclic nature of the preferences on them, they too assign each player a first choice roommate, which was not present in the original assignment. Now suppose that there exists a Pareto improvement to the assignment marked by the dashed red edges. In this assignment, the best roommate of each player is ranked second. In order to make at least one player, say, player i better off, the alternative assignment must allocate i to her first choice roommate j. This is only possible if we find a (non-directed) triangle partition in the constructed graph so that it contains at least one solid black or dotted blue edge, which is ij. We now search for a third player to complete the coalition. Since j just received a bad roommate in the person of i, she must have her first or second choice in the room as well, in order to keep her satisfied. Her second choice is one of her copies j ′ , but j ′ only ranks j third, and i beyond all listed players, so her situation would worsen if we put her up in a room with i and j. On the other hand, j's first choice edge jℓ is of the same color as ij. The position of ℓ is not worse than in the original assignment if and only if (i, j, ℓ) forms a blue or a directed black triangle. This shows that only red, blue, or directed black triangles can appear in a Pareto improved assignment. The existence of such a monochromatic triangle partition implies that there is a directed triangle cover in D.
Existence
In all investigated caes, if the instance admits a feasible assignment, then it also admits a Pareto optimal one. Due to monotonicity in the rank of the worst or best roommate, a chain of Pareto improvements starting at any feasible assignment must end in a poa, which is thus guaranteed to exist. This is the case if lists are complete, since all perfect assignments are feasible then. Not so for incomplete lists-by declaring some other players unacceptable, players can easily reach a situation where not even feasible assignments exist. We now show that in all cases with incomplete lists, deciding whether a feasible assignment, and thus, a poa exists, is NP-complete. Notice that since feasibility is already hard, it bears no importance whether a player judges the coalition based on the best or the worst roommate.
Theorem 3 (Existence, strict and incomplete lists, best or worst roommate counts, 3-person rooms). If lists are incomplete, then deciding whether a feasible assignment exists is
NP-complete even if all preferences are strict, and every room is of size 3.
Proof. We show hardness via a reduction from triangle cover. Given a graph G as the input of this problem, we associate players with vertices and acceptable roommate pairs with edges. The preferences can be chosen arbitrarily, because they play no role in feasibility anyways. Since feasible assignments must form coalitions of size exactly 3, each assignment in our problem corresponds to a triangle cover and vice versa.
This theorem shows that it is hopeless to find a poa if lists are incomplete, because even deciding whether any exists is NP-complete. Moreover, even if we are given a feasible assignment-which guarantees the existence of a pom-it is also hopeless to find a Pareto improvement, since deciding whether the given assignment itself is a poa is coNP-complete, as shown in Theorems 1 and 2. From this point on, we can thus restrict our attention to instances with complete lists.
Finding a Pareto optimal assignment
As already mentioned, a poa is guaranteed to exist if lists are complete. Here we distinguish all 2 3 cases based on three basic features of the problem, listed as points (ii)-(iv) in the Introduction.
Easy cases
We start with describing and analyzing the tailored variants of serial dictatorship in the cases where it delivers a poa.
Theorem 4 (Finding a poa, strict and complete lists, best roommate counts, 3-person rooms). Serial dictatorship delivers a poa.
Proof. The exact implementation of serial dictatorship is as follows. The first dictator points at her first choice. We fix them and call them a fixed pair. The same pointing happens in each round. If a room reaches its capacity of 3, then the coalition of the 3 players is fixed, and called a fixed triplet. Dictators in already fixed triplets do not point to anyone, and no dictator is allowed to point to anybody in a fixed triplet. If the dictator is already in a fixed pair, then she must point to her best choice player who is not in a fixed pair. If the number of fixed pairs and triplets reaches the number of rooms, then the remaining dictators can only choose players in fixed pairs.
We will now show that this procedure indeed delivers a poa. Let us search for a Pareto improvement. The first dictator clearly cannot be separated from her first choice roommate, because she is her only best-choice partner. This pair is thus a fixed element in any assignment not worse in the Pareto sense than the current one. Subject to this, the second dictator also only has a single best choice roommate, with whom she is in a fixed triplet, and she also cannot be separated from her. The same argument applies further in the induction.
Theorem 5 (Finding a poa, strict and complete lists, worst roommate counts, r i -person rooms, including 3-person rooms). Serial dictatorship delivers a poa.
Proof. If the worst roommate counts, serial dictatorship can be interpreted as follows. In each round, the dictator moves into one of the smallest available rooms of size r i with her best r i − 1 choice roommates. The coalition is fixed and the room is removed from the set of available rooms.
To see correctness, we again apply induction. Clearly the dictator of each step cannot be better off in any assignment, since serial dictatorship gave her the fewest possible top choices on her list. Example 1. Figure 4 illustrates an instance. We run serial dictatorship in the three settings, in which it delivers a pom. We assume the order of dictators to be 1, 2, . . . , 9.
• strict and complete lists, best roommate counts, 3-person rooms
The first dictator, player 1 chooses her first choice partner player 5 and they become a fixed pair. Then, the second dictator, player 2 chooses player 1, so these three form a fixed triplet. The third dictator cannot choose her first or second choice players 2 and 5, thus she becomes a fixed pair with player 4. Now it is exactly player 4 who is next to choose, and she completes the fixed triple by adding player 6. The remaining 3 players are assigned to the last room. The outcome is the following partition: (1 2 5), (3 4 6), (7 8 9) .
• strict and complete lists, worst roommate counts, 3-person rooms
The first dictator, player 1 chooses her first and second choice partners player 5 and 4, and they occupy a room. The next dictator is player 2, whose first 3 choices are taken, thus she moves into a room with her two best available choices, players 9 and 8. The remaining 3 players are assigned to the last room. The outcome is the following partition: (1 4 5), (2 8 9), (3 6 7).
• strict and complete lists, worst roommate counts, r i -person rooms
Let the rooms have capacity 2, 3, and 4 each. The first dictator, player 1 chooses her first choice partner player 5, and they occupy the smallest room. The next dictator is player 2, who cannot choose her first choice player 1, since her assignment is already fixed, thus she moves into the 3-person room with her best available choices, players 4 and 9. The remaining 4 players are assigned to the largest room. The outcome is the following partition: (1 5), (2 4 9), (3 6 7 8). 
Hard cases
In all remaining cases, finding a poa is hopeless, even though it is guaranteed to exist. We show this in two steps, similarly to the technique used by Aziz et al. [2] . First we observe that either all poas of an instance or none of them satisfy the property that all players receive one of their best outcomes. Then, we show that an NP-complete decision problem can be reduced to deciding whether a poa exists with this property. In other words: by computing any poa in polynomial time, one could answer the NP-complete decision problem in polynomial time. In the coming three proofs for different cases, we define what a best outcome for a player is, and use three different NP-complete decision problems, each of which naturally reduces to one of our hard problems.
Theorem 6 (Finding a poa, strict and complete lists, best roommate counts, r i -person rooms). Computing a poa is at least a hard as the NP-complete unary bin packing problem.
Proof. The input of unary bin packing is a set of item sizes, and a bin size, all encoded in unary.
The goal is to group all items into bins so that the total item size in each bin is exactly the bin size. This problem has been shown to be NP-complete by Garey and Johnson [12] . We construct an instance of the poa problem to each input of unary bin packing. We will show that all poas order each player to a room with a first ranked roommate if and only if a bin packing exists.
Each item of size i in unary bin packing corresponds to i players in the poa problem. The players of one item have their unique first choice player among themselves, in a circular manner. The rest of the preference lists can be chosen arbitrarily. To guarantee that all players have a first choice roommate, we need to keep every preference cycle together. This is equivalent to keeping the items of the bin packing problem unsplit, and thus it is possible if and only if there is a perfect bin packing.
This reduction from unary bin packing immediately implies that the proof is valid even if all rooms are of equal size.
Theorem 7 (Finding a poa, ties, complete lists, best roommate counts, 3-person rooms).
Computing a poa is at least a hard as the NP-complete directed triangle cover problem.
Proof. We construct an instance of the poa problem to each input of directed triangle cover. Let us consider a digraph D. Vertices in D correspond to players in our assignment problem. If a player i had an outgoing edge towards player j in D, then i ranks j first. All other players are ranked second by i. A directed triangle cover exists in D if and only if there is an assignment where each player has at least one first choice roommate. This latter happens if and only if all poas have this property. Proof. To each input G of the triangle cover problem, we now construct an instance of the poa problem. Starting with G, let us assign rank 1 to all neighbors of each player. Now we complete G by adding all missing edges and assign rank 2 on both end vertices of such an edge.
We claim that there is a poa that gives every player two of her first ranked roommates if and only if a triangle cover exists in G. If a triangle cover exists in G, then it delivers an assignment consisting of original edges only, thus it is possible to assign each player into a room with first-choice roommates only. Since each player reaches her best outcome in this assignment, it also must be Pareto optimal. To see the other direction, we assume that there is a poa that orders each player to a room with only first ranked roommates. This assignment must then consist of the edges of G exclusively, and thus it is a triangle cover in G.
Conclusion
We have studied complexity issues in the Pareto optimal coalition formation problem in which players have preferences over each other, and the coalitions must be of a fixed size. We have investigated a number of variants of this problem and determined the complexity of both verifying Pareto optimality and finding a poa.
One natural direction of future research is to forgo the requirement on the perfectness of the assignment. In this case, due to the feasibility of the empty assignment and monotonicity, a poa trivially exists, so our question raised in Section 3 about the existence of an optimal solution does not apply. However, allowing the allocation to be imperfect leads to unnatural strategies in serial dictatorship. If the worst roommate matters, then the dictator is better off choosing her single best roommate and not letting anyone else into the room, however large it is. Besides this, one needs to clarify how to deal with the option of staying alone in a room, which was prohibited in our setting. Depending on the total capacity of rooms, and the way of calculating the value of an imperfect coalition, one can define several natural variants of the problem. We remark that our results in Sections 2 and 4 remain valid for imperfect assignments as well, if the total capacity of rooms equals the number of players, but some agents might be left unassigned-one needs to marginally adjust serial dictatorship, while the hardness proofs carry over.
